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Abstract 
The business strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from the automobile industry implanted in Central-
Eastern  European  (CEE)  countries  (Poland,  Czech  Republic  and  Romania)  is  an offensive  one, global  from 
operational  perspective.  Mainly  it  aims  the  extension  of  market  share  through  horizontal  growth,  generally 
external type single-domain (Mergers and Acquisitions) and internal type (Greenfield investments) in a lower 
degree.  These  enterprises  put  in  practice  also  a  defending  strategy  for  the  owned  market  shares  through 
increasing the efficiency of the production network at global level. This paper aims to present the less evident 
aspects of tax optimization of the applied business strategy by implemented MNEs in the automobile industry in 
CEE,  and  in  this  context,  the  necessity  to  establish  transfer  prices  in  accordance  with  the  OECD 
recommendations, as an obligation assessed by the tax legislations of the considered countries, but also from the 
necessity of efficient run of these enterprises. 
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Introduction 
Under the impulse of the economical and political changes in their business environment, MNEs put in practice 
operational  strategies  (of  production,  of  markets  and  global)  in  order  to  maintain  their  competitiveness  in 
accordance  with  the  customers  exigencies.  The  three  categories  of  operational  strategies,  varying  with  the 
development level of the host state and implicit the advantages offered by localization, can be identified the 
dominant strategy. In interaction with this category of strategy, MNEs has applied to structural strategies (internal 
and external growth, strategic partnership), which modified their configuration, setting up the concentration of 
capital and production in a few regions on the world. These two strategies persuaded by the MNEs, defines jointly 
their business strategy (Ni￿u, 2003). 
There are situations when the business strategy of the MNEs practiced on different markets, may assure a tax 
optimization. More exactly, MNEs implanted in foreign countries, on the way of external growth with the goal of 
the development of new activities, may benefit from the tax advantages, after transferring losses from the level of 
the over-token purchased firm on the profits of the parent firm. Also, in the case of a profitable subsidiary, the 
fusion with a local loss-making enterprise, can have the strategic goal of production capacity extension, and 
implicit, profit reduction of the new subsidiary (Mazerolle, 2006). In addition, the lack of harmonization of tax 
regulations on global level, permit the manipulation of transfer prices by MNEs for an optimal geographical profit 
distribution in order to decrease tax charges. However, the transfer price has to assure also an efficient allocation 
of the MNEs’ inner resources and its administrative establishment on tax reasons, may generate efficiency losses, 
hard to identify. In this context, the drawn conclusion is that, the business strategy of the MNEs which invoke the 
approach of external growth for abroad implantation, may guarantee a tax optimization, in the conditions of the 
assignation  of  transfer  prices  according  to  the  OECD  recommendations  in  this  field,  and  implicit  the  tax 
legislation of each host country, is the suggested solution, in order to assure the efficient run of these firms. A 
significant example can be the business strategy of MNEs from the automobile industry in the CEE countries 
(Poland, Czech Republic and Romania). 148 
1.The  role  of  the  external  growth  in  the  business  strategy  of  the  MNEs  from  the 
automobile industry of some CEE countries 
MNEs from the worldwide automobile industry (Volkswagen Group, Fiat, GM - Opel, Renault, Ford, etc.), which 
were implanted in CEE countries (Poland, Czech Republic and Romania) searched to obtain benefits through 
combining their own competitive advantages with the comparative advantages of the host countries, completed 
with  the  advantages  of  internalization.  Beyond  the  favourable  legal,  economic  and  politic  climate  for 
implantations, the analyzed countries dispose of certain comparative advantages in the production of automobiles: 
the existence of an automobile industry (Skoda in Czech Republic; Fabrika Samochodow Malolitrazowych-FSM, 
Fabryka Samochodow Osobowy-FSO, Fabryka Samochodow Lublin-FSL in Poland; Dacia Pite￿ti, Automobile 
Craiova  in  Romania),  of  local  subcontractors  (Gumotex,  Karsit,  Jihostroj  Velesin,  Magneton,  Motorpal,  Cz 
Strakonice in Czech Republic; Kirchhoff Polska, Gedia Poland, HP Polska TI Poland in Poland; Caranda, Rombat 
Bistri￿a, Varta, Tudor, Ceproplast S.A. in Romania), and the main advantage is represented by the favourable 
proportion of cost-quality of workforce. In these conditions, the implantation in Central-Eastern Europe make 
possible for the  multinational firms to benefit  from low  costs in the  framework of a classical delocalization 
strategy based on the competitive price search. In this case, the result of the production rationalization strategy is a 
vertical type implantation. In addition, the international breakdown of the production process, specific to the 
automobile industry can offer an auxiliary explanation for this strategic logic. 
The quasi-saturation of the western markets enforced the global carmakers to invest in CEE countries in order to 
conquer  the  internal  market  of  the  implantation  places  and  the  neighbour  markets.  This  type  of  strategy  is 
explained through the objective of transport costs minimization and the necessity of proximity to the clients. The 
extension of the market to CEE countries also allows the automobile MNEs to amortize the product development 
costs when their lifecycle are shortened. In addition, the local production offers a better adjustment to the local 
norms and information about competitors. In this case, the implantations are horizontal type and embrace the form 
of production or sale subsidiaries, specific to a commercial (market) strategy. 
In the  same  time, automobile MNEs are engaged in global strategies, considering  CEE countries  straight an 
extension of the West-European markets. They establish, in this area, a productive network designated to supply 
local,  European  and  global  markets,  in  correspondence  with  the  rationalization  and  industrial  specialization 
scheme at continental level. The majority of the implantations realized by the carmakers are outcome of this type 
of strategy.  
Therefore, the business strategy of the MNEs implanted in the CEE countries, is of offensive type, global from 
operational perspective, pursuing mainly the expansion of market shares through a mono-sector external type 
horizontal growth (e.g. VW purchase Skoda in Czech Republic; Fiat buy FSM in Poland; Renault acquire Dacia 
Pite￿ti  in  Romania  etc.),  and  in  a  small  compass  internal  type  (GM-Opel  realize  a  Greenfield  investment  in 
Poland). The  defence  of  the  already  conquered  market  shares  through  the  increased  efficiency  of  the  global 
production networks, in order to face the competition at global level, is also a strategic direction (Ni￿u, B￿descu, 
2005). 
The  external  growth  of  the  MNEs,  realized  through  mergers  or  acquisitions,  generates  a  series  of  collective 
advantages and risks. Generally, the mergers and acquisitions are perceived as, at the level of developing countries 
analyzed as saviours for the local firms, potentially rewarding, but on the brink of crash (bankruptcy). However, 
the reorganization of the target firms may generate the decrease of work places, and implicit unemployment, the 
impact of these forms of growth for the host country are inauspicious from social point of view. Under the impact 
of competition, created by the take-over operations, the acquisition value of the target firm can increase against its 
real (stock exchange) value, which makes in time unsuccessful several similar activities. This aspect may be 
amplified by the technical, managerial and cultural problems generated by the take-over of the target firm, without 
being guaranteed a productivity growth at the level of the overtaken firm (Meier, Schier, 2005). Additional, must 
be mentioned the fact that, MNEs can obtain a tax optimization through the technique of external growth. More 
exactly, the tax advantages from which benefit the abroad implanted subsidiaries, through external growth, with 
the aim of developing new activities, targeting: the transfer of the subsidiary’s losses upon the gains of the parent 
company,  the  possibility  to  deduce  from  its  gross  profits  the  interests  due  loans  granted  to  the  subsidiary, 
respective the appeal to mergers – acquisitions with a local deficient subsidiary, in the case of a subsidiary with 
surplus, in order to shrink the second’s profits (Mazerolle, 2006). In this context, the lack of harmonization of tax 
regulations at global level permits a manipulation of the transfer prices, for an optimal geographical distribution of 
the profits, in order to diminish the tax charges, with negative effects on the efficiency of the MNE. 149 
2.  The  OECD  recommendations  for  methods  to  determine  the  transfer  price  and  the 
analysis of regulations in this field in some CEE countries 
The prices practiced in the transactions of goods and services proceeded between the subsidiaries of a MNE, 
called transfer prices, can be determined administratively, depending on the interests of the parent company and 
the involved subsidiaries. Multinational companies can constitute intra-group markets, where competition does 
not manifest. Therefore, the prices for the transactions practiced on these markets are not result of the reference 
between demand and supply, but the result of the will and the interests of these firms, which many times have to 
prove their correctness. At international level, the national legislations are different regarding the determination 
and evaluation of transfer prices. Additionally, the lack of tax regulation harmonization at global level tempts the 
MNEs to make appeal to the transfer price manipulation. In this case appears the risk of a double taxation, in the 
origin and host countries, and for the tax administrations from these countries difficulties in the verification of the 
correctitude in the determination of gross profits.  
Based on these facts, OECD manifests a permanent interest in order to assure on global level a convergence 
regarding transfer price regulations. In this way, must be mentioned that the OECD recommendations are based 
on respecting the principle of perfect fair competition announced by OECD Model Tax Convention in art. 9(1), 
ground for bilateral tax conventions between member countries and other countries. Based on this principle, the 
applied transfer price between two subsidiaries of a MNE is just (fair), from the tax administrations point of view, 
if it is situated similar to the level of prices practiced by two independent enterprises, who deals with comparable 
transactions. Consequently, on one hand, the un-treatment of subsidiaries of a MNE as irresoluble units of a single 
unified group, but as distinct units, puts them on the plan of taxation as equals to the similar independent firms, in 
favour to the expansion of the international commerce and foreign direct investments. On other hand, in order to 
an alike comparison to be possible, there shouldn’t be important differences between the compared situations, 
which influence the methodology of determining the price or the transactional profit, depending on the applied 
transfer price determination method. Otherwise, there are proposed reliable corrections, in order to eliminate the 
incidence of such differences. The OECD recommendations maintain a hierarchy in determination of the transfer 
pricing methods, estimating that the traditional transaction methods (comparable uncontrolled price method, cost 
plus method, resale price method) are the only ones which respect the principle of perfect fair competition. OECD 
recognizes that in some cases it is impossible to apply a pure transactional method. In this case the MNE can 
submit  a  profit  based  method,  following  the  study  of  firms’  profitability  (transactional  net  margin  method, 
comparable  profit  method,  and  profit  split  method)  (OECD,  2001).  Without  denying  its  importance,  OECD 
manifests its circumspection regarding the comparable profit method. The transfer price is only one component 
used in the determination of profit, being unfair adjusting the profit of a less performing MNE for the simple 
reason that it is not as profitable as one of its competitor. Because of this, OECD tends to uphold the method of 
consolidated profit split of the MNE between its subsidiaries, and also the method of net margin, recommending 
as last case methods. 
Generally, in the case of EU countries, the regulations referring to transfer prices follow the recommendations of 
OECD regarding the determination methods and the prioritization in applying transactional methods (Table no.1). 150 
Table no. 1  
















Austria  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Belgium  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Czech  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Denmark  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Switzerland  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
France  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Germany  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Italy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Great Britain  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Poland  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Portugal  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Romania  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Slovakia  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Spain  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Hungary  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: after Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing Global Reference Guide, www.ey.com, 2008; Taxation Code of 
Romania, Meteor Press, Bucharest, 2006. 
 
As a rule, for the determination of the transactions market price, the tax administrations will use the method 
applied by the MNE, with the exception of the case in which the used method does not reflect the market price of 
the products and services, object of the transaction. In this case, the tax administrations will apply the most 
adequate alternative from the traditional transaction methods (comparable uncontrolled price method, cost plus 
method, resale price method) or any other methods recognized by the OECD directives regarding the transfer 
pricing (net margin method and split profit method), taking in consideration the circumstances individually for 
each and every case, respective the market conditions, contractual terms, special competitive conditions. 
3. Scenarios regarding MNEs’ tax optimization by external growth with applicability in 
the automobile industry in CEE countries. Effects of the manipulation of transfer prices. 
Taking in consideration the business strategy of the implanted MNEs, with predilection on the way of external 
growth, in the automobile industry in Poland, Czech Republic and Romania, with the necessity of respecting the 
principle of perfect competition in the determination of transfer pricing, in accordance with the tax legislation in 
the mentioned countries, can be sketched out based on a simple, extremely general and hypothetic example, the 
possibilities of tax harmonization of these firms. Additionally, it is bought in discussion and analyzed the effect of 
transfer  price  manipulation,  aiming  the  taxation,  on  the  functioning  efficiency  of  the  MNE.  The  drawn 
conclusions from the further analysis come to complete the general aspects of the business strategy of the MNEs 
from  investigated  the  automobile  industry.  The  aim  of  the  demarche  is,  on  one  hand,  to  emphasize  aspects 
regarding taxation in their business strategy, and on other hand, to point out the fact that the reduction of the tax 
charges does not have to be the only goal of the MNEs in the moment when they determine transfer prices. 
Consequently, the determination of these prices in accordance with OECD recommendations becomes not only a 151 
limitation, induced by the tax legislation in the analyzed host countries, but also a necessity imposed by the 
efficient functioning of the MNE. 
It is considered, thus, a MNE which produce and distribute, at the level of parent firm in the origin country, a 
product conventionally noted with X. The nominated cost function is CT = 312.500 + 25Q + 0,0015Q
2, where Q 
represents the production volume of the considered product X, the market price being p for the commercialized 
product  established  varying  with  demand  and  costs  so  that  maximize  the  profit.  In  the  conditions  in  which 
conventionally we consider as demand function p= 100 – 0,0010Q, where p represents the price of the considered 
product X, the profit reaches the maximal peak, when the marginal cost (Cmg) equals the marginal earnings (Vmg), 
which determines the sale price of 85 EURO/piece and an optimal quantity of 15.000 pieces (Cmg = Vmg; 25 + 
0,0030 = 100 – 0,0020Q; Q = 15.000 pieces; p = 100 – 0,0010 x 15.000 = 85 EURO) 
∗. 
In the condition in which the considered MNE, from rational point of view of the production process, applies to 
the external growth, by acquisitioning from abroad a production subsidiary, this (year N) can register a deficit, 
thanks to the investments realized for technological modernization and R&D costs. In year N, the financial results 
of the MNE are presented in Table no. 2. At the level of the parent firm, the turnover is of 1.333.000 EURO, the 
costs are in sum of 1.098.000 EURO and the gross profit is 235.000 EURO. To notice is how the loss at the level 
of the implanted subsidiary on the way of external growth on a new market will diminish the gross profit of the 
MNE, which emphasizes the possibility of a tax optimization realized by the MNE in parallel with the practice of 
its business strategy. 
Table no. 2 
Financial results of the multinational enterprise with a shortfall subsidiary (year N) 
- Thousands Euro - 
Financial results of the parent firm   
Total costs                                         1.025 
Gross profit                                         250 
Total                                             1.275 
Turnover                                 1.275 
 
Total                                     1.275 
Financial results of the subsidiary in year N   
Total costs                                           73 
 
Total                                                73 
Turnover                                    58 
Loss                                        15 
Total                                       73 
Financial results of the multinational enterprise   
Total costs                            1.025 +  73 = 1.098 
Gross profit                             250 –  15 =  235 
Total                                 1.098 + 235 = 1.333                              
Turnover                       1.275 + 58 = 1.333 
 
Total                                     1.333 
After a few years (N+5),  the  shortfall  subsidiary  will  become  profitable,  evidence  of  the  succeeding  business 
strategy of the MNE. In the current conditions, the cost function at the level of the foreign subsidiary is CTA = 
100.000 + 20Q + 0,0010Q
2, proving a cost reduction due to the strategy of rationalization for the production 
process pursued by the MNE. The cost function at the level of parent firm which assure, in the current situation, 
only the distribution of the X product produced by the subsidiary is CTB = 62.500 + 5Q + 0,0005Q
2, and the 
demand function for product X is p = 100 – 0,001Q. Taking in consideration the fact that, the MNE will be 
efficient in the condition of resource allocation so that to maximize the consolidated profit, which, in this context, 
requires the determination of the price for product X at which this will be transferred between intra-firm from the 
level of the foreign subsidiary to the level of the parent firm. With other words, at the level of the MNE the 
transfer price and implicit the optimal quantity to be produced and transferred intra-firm, must be established in 
order to the marginal cost to equal the marginal revenue (Cmg =Vmg) at the level of the MNE. 
In these conditions, the optimal quantity to be produced by the foreign subsidiary (Q) will be 15.000 pieces, the 
transfer to the parent firm for distribution at the price (pt) of 50 EURO/piece (Cmg = CmgA + Cmgb = Vmg; CmgA = 
Vmg – CmgB; 20 + 0,0020Q = (100 – 0,0020Q) – (5 + 0,0010Q); Q = 15.000 pieces; CmA = VmA; pt = 20 + 0,0020 x 
15.000 = 50 EURO/piece). In these conditions, the financial results of the MNE are as follows: a turnover of 
2.025.000 EURO (50 x 15.000 + 85 x 15.000 = 750.000 + 1.275.000 = 2.025.000 EURO), costs of 1.625.000 
                                                            
∗  The numeric example is adapted after F. Mazerolle, Les firmes multinationales, Vuibert Press, Paris, 2006, p. 235-243 152 
EURO (100.000 + 20 x 15.000 + 0,0010 x 15.000 x 15.000 + 50 x 15.000 + 62.500 + 5 x 15.000 + 0,0005 x 
15.000 x 15.000 = 625.000 + 750.000 + 250.000 = 625.000+1.000.000=1.625.000 EURO), and gross profit of 
125.000 EURO (750.000 – 625.000 = 125.000 EURO). 
In the conditions of a tax rate of 8% in the origin country of the MNE and of 34% in the host country, the 
consolidated net profit will be 296.500 EURO (275.000 – 275.000 x34% + 125.000 – 125.000 x 8% = 275.000 – 
93.500 + 125.000 – 10.000 = 181.500 + 115.000 = 296.500 EURO), and the MNE could be tempted to manipulate 
the transfer price, in the sense of increase, in order to avoid from taxation a part of the profit of the foreign 
subsidiary (Table no. 3, Case I.). 
If we take in consideration this last possibility, a raise of transfer price to 60 EURO/piece, will permit from 
perspective point of view, a reduction of the gross profit, in the condition of amplifying of the net profit, but the 
MNE will not assure the optimal resource allocation, registering a hardly identifiable loss at the level of efficiency 
(Table no. 2 and Table no.3). Must be mentioned that, if this loss is maintained, the tax advantages generated by 
the transfer price manipulation disappears as the consequence of the modification of the tax rate for the profit in 
the origin country, respectively the host country of the MNE. 
Therefore, at the transfer price (pt) of 60 EURO/piece, increases the produced quantity by the foreign subsidiary 
and delivered intra-firm of 20.000 pieces (Cmg = CmgA + CmgB = Vmg; CmAg = Vmg – CmgB; 20 + 0,0020Q = (100 – 
0,0020Q) – (5 + 0,0010Q) + (60 - 50); Q = 20.000 pieces), and the transfer price of the product at the level of 
parent firm will be reduced to 80 EURO/piece (100 – 20.000 x 0,001 = 80 EURO/piece). 
Table no. 3 
Financial results of the MNE with a profitable subsidiary in the case of an optimal transfer price (I.) and in the 
case of an administratively increased transfer price (II) (both for year N+5)  
Thousands Euro - 
Case I.  Case II.  Case I.  Case II. 
Financial results of the parent firm              
Total costs                          1.000 
Gross profit                           275 
Tax on profit                           10 
Net profit                             253 
Total (costs+ gross profit)              1.275 















Financial results of the subsidiary       
Total costs                            625 
Gross profit                           125 
Tax on profit                         42,5 
Net profit                            82,5 
















Financial results of the MNE       
Total costs                1.000+625=1.625 
Gross profit                   275+125=400 
Tax on profit                  22+42,5=64,5 
Net profit                  253+82,5=335,5         
Total (costs+ gross profit)    1.625+400=2.025                            
1.562,5+900 =2.462,5 
37,5 + 300 = 337,5 
12,75 + 24 = 36,75 
24,75 + 276 = 300,75  
2.462,5+337,5=2.800                                   










As result of the manipulation of transfer price, the MNE will register the following financial results: a turnover of 
2.800.000 EURO (20.000 x 60 + 20.000 x 80 = 1.200.000 + 1.600.000 = 2.800.000 EURO), costs in sum of 
2.462.500 EURO (100.000 + 20 x 20.000 + 0,0010 x 20.000 x 20.000 + 60 x 20.000 + 62.500 + 5 x 20.000 + 
0,0005 x 20.000 x 20.000 = 900.000 + 1.200.000 + + 362.500 = 900.000 + 1.562.500 = 2.462.500 EURO) and a 
gross profit of 337.500 EURO (1.200.000 – 900.000 + 1.600.000 – 1.562.500 = 300.000 + 37.500 = 337.500 
EURO). In the conditions of a tax rate of 8% in the origin country of the MNE and of 34% in the implantation 
country, the consolidated net profit will be 300.750 EURO (300.000 – 300.000 x 8% + 37.500 - 37.500 x 34% = 
300.000 – 24.000 + 37.500 – 12.750 = 276.000 + 24.750 = 300.750 EURO) (Table no. 3, Case II). 153 
In the considered hypothetic example, at establishing the level of its transfer price, the MNE had as objective the 
maximization of the consolidated profit. However, in reality, the principal logic followed is of reducing the tax 
contributions, the transfer price being established administratively, with negative effects on the efficiency of the 
rolled activities, at the level of the entire enterprise. It is to remark the fact that, in this context, the establishment 
of the transfer price with revere of the principle of complete competition, will eliminate this drawback. Taking as 
benchmark the market price for product X, the risk of inefficient operation of the MNE will decrease. The two 
independent firms, taken as benchmarks, will take as exogenous data the price established on the market and will 
determine the quantity of the delivered products in order to maximize their profits. Also, the MNE will comply 
with the tax stipulations of the implantation country regarding the determination and methods of transfer pricing, 
what will reduce the risk of penalty payments for tax administrations in the implantation country, where in the 
case the tax fraud determined by the transfer price manipulation would have been proved. The manipulation of the 
transfer price appears when the differences in the tax rates at the level of the considered countries are substantial; 
the registered net income can cover the loss of efficiency. In the case when the difference in taxation is reduced, 
the loss of the efficiency is maintained; the manipulation of the transfer price will lead to a decreased net profit. 
In addition, in order to realize some kind of diminish of the profit in the implantation country and a cut for the tax 
contributions, the MNE can apply again to a tax optimization. Parallel with the strategic necessity to increase its 
production capacity, the enterprise can propose an external growth; the profitable subsidiary can merge with a 
local shortfall company  from the same sphere of activity. If  we consider for year N+5, the turnover  for the 
subsidiary is in a value of 750.000 EURO and the total costs spent 625.000 EURO, the registered net profit will be 
of 125.000 EURO. 
Table no. 4 
Financial results of the new foreign subsidiary 
Thousands Euro - 
Financial results of the foreign subsidiary   
Total costs                                           625 
Gross profit                                           125  
Total                                                750 
Turnover                                   750 
 
Total                                      750 
Financial results of the shortfall firm   
Total costs                                           325 
 
Total                                                325 
Turnover                                   200 
Loss                                       125 
Total                                      200 
Financial results of the new foreign subsidiary   
Total costs                                 625 + 325 = 950 
Gross profit                                  125 - 125 = 0 
Total                                      750 + 325 = 950                     
Turnover                         750 + 200 = 950 
 
Total                            750 + 200 = 950 
The firm acquisitioned by the MNE in order to fusion with the profitable subsidiary has a turnover of 200.000 
EURO, total costs of 325.000 EURO, registering a loss of 125.000 EURO (Table no. 4). It is ascertained for 
simplification that the gross profit of the subsidiary is equal with the loss registered by the considered firm to 
realize the fusion. The MNE managed to assure a tax reduction on profit, but implicit a diminution of the equities 
value. This negative aspect is compensated by a capital gain owing to the raise of the shares value, and to be 
added also the success of the business strategy registered by the MNE. 
Conclusions 
The MNEs from the CEE automobile industry are applying with predilection to the external growth succeed, in 
the same time with the fulfilment of the strategic objective with economical and commercial facets, to realize also 
a tax optimization. On one hand, the tax objectives do not have to be the exclusive goal of a merger or acquisition 
operation, on other hand the taxation dimension of the business strategy on the MNE should not be neglected. 
Also, in the context of the followed business strategy for the MNE, the intra-group transfers must be realized at 
prices settled in harmony with the tax legislation from the implantation spaces, in accordance with the OECD 
recommendations. In the case of their manipulation, there wont be resource allocation in such manner that to 
guarantee  a  consolidated  profit  maximization  at  the  level  of  the  MNE.  If  the  taxation  discrepancy  between 154 
countries  is  significant,  thus  the  MNE  to  be  tempted  to  manipulate  the  transfer  pricing  and  to  reduce  the 
consolidated gross profit, the obtained tax gain can cover the loss of efficiency. In the case that, this disparity is 
reduced, the tax gain will not compensate the efficiency loss and the administratively determined transfer price 
will generate a reduced net profit. 
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